The Concept of Person in the Metaphysics of Morals: From a Formal to a Material Concept. The Kantian Subject: New Interpretative Essays
Soraya Nour Sckell
Abstract
While in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant wishes to search for and consolidate the ‘highest principle of morality’, in the Metaphysics of Morals he aims at deriving contentual duties from this formal principle. The concept of person plays a central role in the execution of this task and is already strategically mentioned in the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’. At a first moment, the concept of person is transposed from Kant’s Groundwork. But beyond that, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant develops the transition from rational moral being to particular human being, and insofar as the human being is considered in its multiple composition, the concept of person gains a material determination. Hence, as ‘Preliminary Concept’, the formal concept of person is not only a precondition for all other concepts that Kant unfolds in the Metaphysics of Morals but also a first step towards the reconstruction of the material concept of person. This chapter enquires how the formal concept of person from the ‘Preliminary Concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals’ is ascribed material content in the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue.
Sckell, Soraya Nour. The Concept of Person in the Metaphysics of Morals: From a Formal to a Material Concept. The Kantian Subject: New Interpretative Essays, Taylor and Francis, 2023, pp. 121–131, pp. 121-131. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003462415-10